HOTHREAT

CBRN

A set of 4 exercises

Co-funded by
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Document introduction

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Project consortium

Research, expertise, technology providers

End-users

Law enforcement agencies

The material for this publication was developed and reviewed by the HOTHREAT consortium:

Partner organization name	Country
University of Lodz	PL
Dynamic Safety Corporation	PL
Polaris Hospitality Enterprises	PL
Hotel Boss	PL
Safety Core	PL
International Security and Emergency Management Institute	SK
National Institute of Aerospace Technology	ES
Atiram Hotels	ES
The Center for Security Studies	EL
Hellenic Police	EL
Konngruent	RO
Sigoria Security Solutions	PL
Center for Social Innovation	CY
Aphrodite Hills Resort	CY
The Nicosia Tourist Board	CY
Lodz Regional Police Headquarters	PL
Fondazione Safe	IT
Ministry of Internal Administration	PT
Department of the Interior of the Generalitat de Catalunya	ES

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1. Introduction and executive summary

The large-scale exercise programme consisted of four exercises based on different scenarios, all of which focused on summarizing and practically verifying the solutions developed within the project to enhance hotel security against terrorist attacks involving CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear) agents. The exercises aimed to validate the developed procedures, organisational recommendations and dedicated equipment for preventing, countering and responding to CBRN incidents in a hotel environment. A key element was the hands-on training of security personnel and hotel staff, enabling them to practice operational procedures under realistic conditions. The exercises also strengthened coordination and information exchange between hotel staff, police and other emergency services, while structured feedback was collected from participants after each scenario to further refine the project outcomes. Particular attention was paid to identifying potential weaknesses, gaps or inconsistencies in existing procedures and organisational arrangements in order to achieve the planned objectives.

Within the exercise scenarios, participants practiced recommended procedures and solutions tailored for hotels, including pre-event check procedures such as searching premises in accordance with the HOT protocol and securing suspicious items using the 4C procedure. The training covered identification of a CBRN event (procedures 5S and 1,2,3+), communication during an incident using the ETHANE protocol, and immediate response principles such as “Remove, remove, remove.” Staff actions following a reported threat involving a CBRN dispersal device, cooperation with emergency services, and the application of AR and VIP procedures were also exercised across the different scenarios. Furthermore, the exercises addressed preparation for evacuation, available CBRN evacuation options, and the implementation of initial decontamination measures (partial neutralisation of contamination), ensuring that both hotel personnel and responding services were prepared to act effectively and coherently under varying threat conditions.

All four exercises followed a structured agenda combining coordination briefings, table-top discussions and full-scale operational play. Each exercise began with a coordination meeting involving hotel management, exercise staff and representatives of emergency services, during which the scope of activities and roles were clarified. This was followed by a table-top exercise and dedicated briefings with services and role-players. The operational phase included initiation of the scenario, facility search conducted by hotel staff, simulated CBRN incident (e.g. chemical agent dispersal), activation of emergency response, evacuation procedures, initial decontamination, and rescue operations carried out jointly with police, fire and medical services. Each exercise concluded with a structured debriefing session and discussion of observations. All scenarios incorporated elements defined in the official agenda and were

systematically evaluated by a team of CBRN security experts in accordance with an agreed methodology in order to assess the effectiveness and functionality of the developed security measures, procedures and organisational solutions. The conclusions and recommendations identified during the evaluations were implemented on an ongoing basis, contributing to the continuous improvement of the project results and strengthening the overall resilience of the participating hotels.

The exercises were organized in:

1. Tres Torres Hotel & Arenas Hotel in Barcelona, Spain (13th and 14th of January 2025)
2. Arenas Hotel in Barcelona, Spain (13th and 14th of January 2025)
3. University of Lodz Training and Conference Centre in Lodz, Poland (4th and 5th of June 2025)
4. Hotel BOSS in Warsaw, Poland (2nd and 3rd of February 2026).

2. Large Scale Exercise no. 1 - A simulated VIP visit in a hotel

Place: Arenas Atiram Hotel Barcelona, Carrer del Capità Arenas, 20, Les Corts, 08034 Barcelona

14/01/2025 - 17:00- 19:00 - Preparatory activities, coordination briefing
15/01/2025 - 9.00 – 11:00 – TTX
15/01/2025 -11:00 – 16:30 - Large Scale Exercise

Main objectives:

- Conducting a large-scale exercise summarizing the solutions developed within the project to improve the security of the hotels against terrorist attacks using CBRN (chemical, biological, radiation and nuclear) agents
- validation of developed procedures, organizational recommendations and equipment for countering and responding to CBRN events
- train security personnel and practice procedures in a hotel environment
- collect feedback from participants in the exercise to improve the project outcomes
- enhance coordination between hotel staff, police, and other services
- identify any weaknesses in current procedures.

Specific objectives:
To practice recommended procedures and solutions developed for hotels, such as:

- **Check procedures** – before the event (search of premises for identification (**HOT** protocol) and securing (**procedure 4C**) of suspicious items – for services and hotel staff
- Identification of CBRN event - procedure **5S, 1,2,3+**
- The communication during a CBRN event – **ETHANE** protocol
- **Remove, remove, remove**
- Staff actions and communication following a reported threat of attack - CBRN dispersal device
- Cooperation with emergency services
- Application and AR
- VIP procedures
- Preparation for evacuation – for services and hotel staff
- CBRN **evacuation** options – for services and hotel staff
- **Initial decontamination** (partial neutralization of contamination) – for services and hotel staff

Mobile Application

- Validation of the application in the hotel security management process in a real-life exercise
- Validation of all functions in situations:
    - search
    - injured person

- evacuation
- a person with a disability/mobility impairment

- Measure the duration of individual actions
- Gather feedback from end users

Agenda:
14/01/2025 - 16:00- 19:00 - Preparatory activities, coordination briefing in Arenas

General plan - timeline

Time	Description of task	Responsible
14/01/2025		
16:00-19:00	Coordination briefing with management staff and services in Arenas	Safety Core Personnel needed: Exercise staff, hotel management staff, services representatives (great if English speaking). Get throughout all planned activities
15/01/2025		
9:00-11:00	Table-top exercise	Safety Core
11:00-12:00	Briefing with services	Safety Core/ INTA
12:00-13:00	Debriefing with role-players	Safety Core/ INTA
12:00-13:00	Beginning to enclose the exercise space – if needed	Organizer/Manager/MOSSOS
13:00	**Start of exercise - password STARTx3**	Exercise leader
13:00-13:30	Searching the facility	Hotel staff
13:45	Incident - **dispersion of a** chemical agent	Hotel staff
	Arrival of the police, firefighters, medical service – 10 minutes after call	Police, Firefighters, Medics
13:45-14:00	**Evacuation**	Hotel staff
14:00-15:30	Initial **decontamination**, post-evacuation activities	Hotel staff
	Conducting rescue operations police, medical service	Police, Medics, Civil Protection
NLT 15:30	**End of action - keyword ENDx3**	Exercise leader
15:30	**Lunch**	
15:30-16:30	Discussion of the exercise	Organizer/hotel staff/services

Main episode (general description)
On 01.15.2025, the internationally famous singer Maxymiliano Stellano arranged to stay at the Arenas Atiram Hotel ahead of a important interview. He is known not only for his artistry but also for his controversial and extremist views. Stellano has previously been the target of numerous assassination attempts, including those employing CBRN agents.

As a high-profile individual holding VIP status, the singer was escorted by a security consisting of two police officers. Considering this, the police security team formally requested that the hotel staff implement comprehensive security protocols to ensure the safety of the VIP both prior to and during his stay, specifically by:

- increased attention
- thorough verification of persons staying at the hotel at that time
- control of access to the premises
- check of evacuation routes (4C and HOT)
- check of evacuation assembly points (4C and HOT)
- determination of alternative escape routes (preparation for evacuation)
- increased monitoring of CCTV system (C-confirm)
- check of main traffic routes (security check)
- placement of VIPs in a convenient location for the fastest possible evacuation,
- designation of a room away from other hotel guests
- presentation of an evacuation plan.

During a security search, a suspicious item was discovered, reportedly left behind by one of the hotel guests. At that moment, approximately 25 guests were present in the hotel.

At around 1:40 PM, a police vehicle carrying a VIP and two police officers arrived at the hotel. The VIP, accompanied by the officers and a hotel representative, entered through the main entrance and proceeded to the assigned room.

Once the VIP was situated in the room, one police officer remained outside the door, while the other, alongside the hotel staff member, conducted a security sweep of the facility before relocating to the lobby.

At approximately 1:50 PM, a young man, identified as a hotel guest and carrying a backpack, entered the hotel. His presence did not raise suspicion among the staff. The guest made his way toward the VIP's room, and shortly after reaching the 5th floor, smoke began to disperse from his backpack.

The police officer stationed at the door managed to inform by the radio the officer in the lobby. Both the officer outside the VIP's room and the guest carrying the backpack subsequently collapsed and lay unconscious.

The receptionist was also immediately informed by the police officer on the situation.

General overview - incident site


ITU
0011

3. Large Scale exercise no. 2 - Normal functioning day in a hotel

Place: Tress Torres Atiram Hotels Barcelona, Carrer de Calatrava, 32, Sarrià-Sant Gervasi, 08017 Barcelona, Spain

15/01/2025 - 17:00- 19:00 - Preparatory activities, coordination briefing
16/01/2025 - 9.00 – 11:00 – TTX
16/01/2025 -11:00 – 16:30 - Large Scale Exercise

Main objectives:

- Conducting a large-scale exercise summarizing the solutions developed within the project to improve the security of the hotels against terrorist attacks using CBRN (chemical, biological, radiation and nuclear) agents
- validation of developed procedures, organizational recommendations and equipment for countering and responding to CBRN events
- train security personnel and practice procedures in a hotel environment
- collect feedback from participants in the exercise to improve the project outcomes
- enhance coordination between hotel staff, police, and other services
- identify any weaknesses in current procedures.

Specific objectives:
To practice recommended procedures developed for hotels, such as (choice dependent on detailed scenario):

- **Check procedures** – before the event (search of premises for identification (**HOT** protocol) and securing (**procedure 4C**) of suspicious items – for services and hotel staff
- Identification of CBRN event - procedure **5S, 1,2,3+**
- The communication during a CBRN event – **ETHANE** protocol
- **Remove, remove, remove** (deal with CBRN incident)
- Staff actions and communication following a reported threat of attack - CBRN dispersal device
- Cooperation with emergency services
- **Improvised decontamination** (partial neutralization of contamination) – hotel staff
- **Preparation for evacuation** – hotel staff
- CBRN **evacuation** options (evacuate outside or shelter inside - SIP) – for services and hotel staff

Mobile Application

- Validation of the application in the hotel security management process in a real-life exercise
- Validation of all functions in situations:
    - search
    - injured person

- evacuation
- a person with a disability/mobility impairment

- Measure the duration of individual actions
- Gather feedback from end users

Schedule:

Time	Description of task	Responsible
12/01 – 15/01/2025		
10:00-18:00	On-site briefing	Safety Core, INTA, Mossos d'Esquadra (service coordinator) and general manager of facility. Other participants (depend on needs)
16/01/2025		
9:00-11:00	Table-top exercise	Safety Core, INTA Participants - Hotel staff
11:00-12:00	Briefing with services	Safety Core, INTA All services involved in the exercise
12:00-13:00	Briefing with role players	Safety Core, INTA All role players
12:00-13:00	Beginning to enclose the exercise space – if needed	Organizer/Manager/MOSSOS
13:00	**Start of exercise - password STARTx3**	Safety Core, INTA Start of the exercise according to the plan
15:30	**End of the exercise - keyword END x 3**	Safety Core, INTA The deadline for the exercise.
15:30	**Lunch**	
15:30-16:30	Discussion of the exercise	Safety Core, INTA All participants
16:30-18:00	Exercise assessment (Evaluation team)	Evaluation director, Evaluators

Main episode scenario:

On 16.01.2025 at 13.00 General manager receives a phone call from the head office with information about possible threats of planting dangerous items in the space of the hotel with suggestion of checking the facility.

Around 13:45 in one of the wings on the fourth floor of the hotel, during the everyday activities, a cleaning staff person leaving a room noticed 2 people lying in the corridor. Next to them was a backpack from which smoke was coming out.

The cleaning service person, because of recognising an incident involving an unknown chemical, decided to leave the danger zone immediately. Unfortunately, having no escape route, the person decided to retreat to one of the rooms and follow the SIP procedure. The room furthest away from the incident site was chosen as a shelter. During the withdrawal, the person also decided to inform the hotel guests located in this wing (also cut off from the escape routes). Together with 3 people, the person goes to the room chosen as

a shelter. The person secures the room according to procedure and informs reception of the situation.
The manager/receptionist receives the call and follows the procedures for a CBRN emergency. According to the scheme:

1. Confirm:
    - Confirmation in line with 5S using monitoring
    - Including confirmation through procedure 1,2,3+
2. Clear:
    - Checking evacuation routes (4C and HOT)
    - Checking of assembly points after evacuation (4C and HOT)
    - Designation of alternative evacuation routes (preparation for evacuation)
    - Immediate evacuation of the adjacent area
    - Evacuation away from danger to safe assembly points
    - Isolating the area so that bystanders do not enter the hazard
3. Communicate:
    - Hotel staff to incident manager using apps and AR
    - From the incident manager to the emergency number 112 in accordance with ETHANE
4. Control:
    - Attempting to control the hotel so that no one enters the area until the services arrive on site
    - Crowd control at assembly points, providing first aid
    - Post-evacuation activities follow - segregation of contaminated/ uncontaminated, REMOVEx3.
    - Joint co-operation with police, fire brigade and medical services until operations are completed.

Once the incident is reported to the emergency number 112 and the ETHANE protocol - the call is received and information is passed to the services involved (police, civil services, medical).
The local police arrive in the incident zone with the task of isolating the zone and medical security and carry out their assistance and decontamination procedures.
After the decontamination process of the contaminated 5 people is completed, the end of the exercise is announced.

Hotel Atiram Tres Torres – incident site



Incident site – floor plan

Evacuation stairs


POLICI

4. Large Scale Exercise no. 3 - Incident at the large event

Location: University of Łódź - Training and Conference Center - Dr. Stefana Kopcińskiego 16/18, 90-232 Lodz

Schedule:

- 05/06/2025 - 17:00-19:00 - Preparatory actions, coordination briefing
- 06/06/2025 - 08:00-09:00 - Table Top Exercise (TTX)
- 06/06/2025 - 11:00-15:30 - Large-Scale Exercise

Main Objectives:

- Conduct a large-scale exercise summarizing solutions developed within the project to improve hotel security against terrorist attacks using CBRN agents.
- Validate developed procedures, organizational recommendations, and equipment for preventing and responding to CBRN incidents.
- Train security/hotel personnel and rehearse procedures in a hotel environment.
- Collect participant feedback to refine project results.
- Strengthen coordination between hotel staff, police, and other services.
- Improve cooperation between emergency services and CSK personnel in the event of a chemical attack or crisis.
- Identify weaknesses in procedures.

Specific objectives
To practice recommended procedures and solutions developed for hotels, such as:

- Check procedures – before the event (search of premises for identification (HOT protocol) and §securing (procedure 4C) of suspicious items – for services and hotel staff
- Identification of CBRN event - procedure 5S, 1,2,3+
- The communication during a CBRN event – ETHANE protocol
- Remove, remove, remove
- Staff actions and communication following a reported threat of attack - CBRN dispersal device
- Cooperation with emergency services
- Application and AR
- Preparation for evacuation – for services and hotel staff
- CBRN evacuation options – for services and hotel staff
- Initial decontamination (partial neutralization of contamination) – for services and hotel staff

Mobile Application

- Validation of the application in the hotel security management process in a real-life exercise
- Validation of all functions in situations:
    - Search – if ordered

  - injured person
  - evacuation
  - a person with a disability/mobility impairment
- Measure the duration of individual actions
- Gather feedback from end users

General Timeline:

Date/Time	Task Description	Responsible Party
05/06/2025		
15:15-18:00	Coordination meeting at CSK on exercise organization	Safety Core, CSK, UNILODZ, Police, Fire Brigade
06/06/2025		
08:00-09:00	Table-top exercise	Safety Core, CSK representative
09:00-10:00	Coordination briefing with services	Safety Core, CSK, UNILODZ, Police, Fire Brigade
10:00-11:00	Briefing with role-players	Safety Core, role-playing team
11:00	Exercise commencement	Safety Core/Police
11:00-14:00	Exercise execution	All involved institutions
14:00-15:00	Exercise summary	Exercise leader

Scenario:

On June 6, 2025, during a conference on environmental changes, at 11:05 a.m. in the auditorium of the CSK accommodation facility (hereinafter referred to as the hotel), an unknown chemical substance is released from an unattended backpack (stage smoke and a scented substance). As a result of the incident, the facility manager decides to evacuate the auditorium and the entire hotel. Information about the threat is passed on to the appropriate emergency services.

The evacuation is carried out in accordance with the applicable procedures – designated hotel staff coordinate the evacuation of participants from the building. Five individuals are contaminated but are able to reach the designated assembly point on their own.

During the evacuation, at 11:20 a.m., a hotel employee responsible for the first floor encounters a group of armed men in room 102, who are likely holding a hostage – a scientific authority in the field of biological safety from the University of Lodz. The employee

does not intervene but reports the information to the evacuation coordinator, who then informs the emergency services. The evacuation continues, and the area in front of the hotel on the southern side (under the SJPdC building) is designated as the assembly zone.

CSK staff continue evacuation and first aid efforts until the arrival of specialized services.

1. Actions of the Police Force Commander:

- Deployment and assignment of a negotiation team (at least 3 negotiators) to resolve the hostage situation.
- Deployment and assignment of the Counter-Terrorist Police Unit (SPKP) from Lodz.

2. Actions of the Negotiation Team (ZN):

- Identification of the perpetrator and determination of their motives.
- Conducting negotiations.

3. Actions of the Police Counter-Terrorism Unit:

- Securing the facility and perimeter.
- While negotiations are ongoing – preparing for an assault.
- Neutralization of a threat (a terrorist exiting through the main entrance).
- Conducting an assault on the CSK facility, first floor (room 102).
- Use of ballistic protection in the form of an armored vehicle (TUR).
- Neutralization of threats in the room and on roof C.
- Checking for a terrorist on roof C – entry via ladder from the south side.
- Escorting the terrorists out of the building.

4. Actions of the NGRP (Police Explosives Reconnaissance):

- After the SPKP assault, inspection of the facility for hazardous devices.
- Location of the threat in the auditorium.

5. Actions of the SPKP Bomb Disposal Team (SM-P SPKP):

- Neutralization of the explosive threat to enable operations by the State Fire Service (JRG PSP).
- After the assault, arrival of the bomb disposal vehicle at the parking area.
- Deployment of a bomb disposal robot inside the facility (ground floor and auditorium).

6. Actions of the PSP Chemical Rescue Team:

- Assessment of the contamination level.
- Establishment of safety zones (red, yellow, green).
- Decontamination of victims and potentially contaminated individuals.
- Analysis of the substance and neutralization of the hazard.

5. Large Scale Exercise no. 4 - Food defence and road tanker accident

Place: Hotel Boss, 20 Żwanowiecka Street, Warsaw, Poland

03/02/2026 - 14:00 - 16:00 – Preparatory activities, coordination briefing
04/02/2026 – 08:00 – 09:00 – TTX
04/02/2026 -11:00 – 14:00 – Large Scale Exercise

Main objectives:

- Conducting a large-scale exercise summarizing the solutions developed within the project to improve the security of the hotels against terrorist attacks using CBRN (chemical, biological, radiation and nuclear) agents
- validation of developed procedures, organizational recommendations and equipment for countering and responding to CBRN events
- train security personnel and practice procedures in a hotel environment
- collect feedback from participants in the exercise to improve the project outcomes
- enhance coordination between hotel staff, police, and other services

Specific objectives:
To practice recommended procedures developed for hotels, such as (choice dependent on detailed scenario):

- Identification of CBRN event - procedure **5S, 1,2,3+**
- The communication during a CBRN event – **ETHANE** / **THEN** protocol
- **Remove, remove, remove** (deal with CBRN incident) – if applicable during the exercise
- Staff actions and communication following a reported threat of incident – truck accident
- Cooperation with emergency services
- CBRN evacuation options -**shelter in place – SIP** – for services and hotel staff
- Procedures for the **acceptance and further processing of food products**
- The reaction of hotel staff to the food contamination situation and cooperation with health authorities during the epidemiological inquiry
- Application and implementation of a **five-step cleaning process** following a CBRN contamination incident

Mobile Application

- Validation of the application in the hotel security management process in a real-life exercise
- Measure the duration of individual actions
- Gather feedback from end users

General plan

Time	Description of task	Responsible
03/02/2026		
14:00-16:00	On-site briefing	Safety Core, ON-SITE coordinator – H. Boss, UniLodz Other participants (depend on needs)
04/02/2026		
8:00-9:00	Table-top exercise	Safety Core, Participants – H. Boss staff
9:00-10:00	Briefing with services	Safety Core, Public services
10:00-11:00	Briefing with role players	Safety Core, All role players
11:00	**Start of exercise - password STARTx3**	Safety Core, Start of the exercise according to the plan - **All exercising components**
14:00	**End of the exercise - keyword END x 3**	Safety Core, The deadline for the exercise **- All exercising components**
14:00-15:00	Summary of the exercise	Exercise leader, all components

Detailed plan

Time	Description of task	Responsible
04/02/2026		
11:00	**Start of exercise**	Safety Core
11:00-12:45	Food defence procedures stages I, II, III	UniLodz., kitchen staff (warehouse manager, cooks, head chef, catering manager, receptionist, MOD- Manager on Duty), observers, exercise coordinators. Role players: 3
	Cleaning procedures – step 1 - preparation	Safety Core – managerial staff, cleaning staff
	Cleaning procedures – step 2 - cleaning	
	Cleaning procedures – step 3 - disinfection	
	Cleaning procedures – step 4 - inspection	
	Cleaning procedures – step 5-	

	servicing	
13:00	Start of incident – ROAD TANKER ACCIDENT	Safety Core, Hotel staff – 4, figurants – 10, 112 emergency number, safety services
	Incident recognition – 123+, 5S Incident response – Shelter in place Notification – THEN, ETHANE First responders/Emergency services arrival	
NLT 14:00	**End of the exercise**	Safety Core
14:00-15:00	Summary of the exercise	Exercise leader, all components

FOOD DEFENCE – Scenario no.1

Delivery and attempt to introduce food based on a fake delivery note

Aim of the exercise

To check:

- knowledge of Food Defence procedures when receiving deliveries,
- warehouse staff vigilance towards deviations from procedures,
- ability to recognize a fake delivery note/invoice,
- response to irregularities and escalation of the incident.

Background

A new food supplier has been working with the hotel for two days. The supplier brings the delivery and leaves it on the delivery ramp without handing it over directly to the warehouse manager, which is against procedure.

After some time, the warehouse manager receives a phone call from the supplier informing him that the shipment is “awaiting pickup”. According to the procedure, information about the delivery should be provided in person during the formal handover of the goods.

Triggering event

The warehouse manager receives a phone call from the supplier with the following information:

“The delivery has already been left on the ramp; the documents are with the goods.”

Decision point 1 – procedure

The warehouse manager should:

- recognize the violation of the procedure (no personal handover),
- decide whether to proceed with the acceptance at all.

Acceptance of documents

The delivery includes a delivery note:

- contains minor errors (e.g., missing order number, typo in the hotel name, inconsistent signature, outdated stamp),
- differs in format or logo from the supplier's standard documents.

Decision point 2 – verification of delivery notes

The warehouse worker should:

- compare delivery notes with applicable templates,
- check the consistency of quantities, assortment, and formal data,
- organoleptically assess the delivered product,
- check whether the goods match the description
- check the weight of the goods
- check whether the goods are fresh and undamaged
- assess the risk of Food Defence (goods left unattended).

Variants of the exercise: depend on staff reaction

The warehouse manager or kitchen chef does not accept the products – according to the variant, the Exercise Manager informs the participants that a similar shipment was delivered two days earlier, but the goods were delivered to the kitchen. The goods were probably contaminated, because of which three people (hotel guests) suffered food poisoning.

The goods are accepted by manager and kitchen chef – according to the variant, the exercise manager informs the participants that the goods were probably contaminated, because of which three hotel guests suffered food poisoning.

Joint action for both variants - In both scenarios, three hotel guests are intoxicated.

After the poisoning, the hotel staff notifies the relevant authorities (sanitary inspector – Exercise leader), who investigates on site.

After transporting hotel guests to the infectious disease's hospital (will not be implemented), the sanitary inspector gives his consent to carry out the disinfection process in the hotel rooms.

Expected correct response according to the exercise assessment form (appendix 1) and cleaning procedures.

CLEANING PROCEDURES – scenario no.2

The cleaning procedures are a continuation of the situation caused by the poisoning of three guests. As a result of the health inspector's decision, there is no risk of infection and cleaning can begin.

ROAD TANKER ACCIDENT – scenario no.3

On February 4, 2026, during a conference on environmental change, at 1:00 p.m. on the nearby S2 national road, an accident involving a road tanker carrying an unknown volatile and toxic substance occurred. As a result of this incident, the tanker ruptured and its contents were released. During the incident, a cloud of gas was created that threatened human life and health, moving towards a building belonging to the BOSS Hotel.

The accident occurred during a coffee break, when some of the participants were outside the building. As a result of the gas, some of the participants (3 people) lost consciousness, some fled towards the main parking lot of the BOSS Hotel, and the rest remained under the Old Windmill building.

The remaining conference participants in the Old Windmill building, following the instructions of the staff, were to secure the building from the inside so that the contamination would not spread, and call for help (information should be forwarded to the Manager on Duty (MOD) in accordance with the THEN protocol, which, according to the information provided, notifies the emergency number 112 in accordance with the ETHANE protocol).

In response to the call, emergency services (police or fire department) were summoned to the scene of the incident, where they took over the decontamination of the injured and evacuated

trapped persons from the Old Windmill building.

7. Evaluation

All four Large-Scale Exercises (LSEs) conducted within the HOTHREAT project were subject to a structured and comprehensive evaluation process carried out by a team of CBRN security experts. The overall purpose of the evaluation was to validate the functionality, effectiveness and practical applicability of the developed procedures, organisational solutions and training materials aimed at improving hotel preparedness against terrorist attacks involving CBRN agents. The fourth LSE, conducted in Warsaw in February 2026, constituted the final validation phase of the project and built directly upon the findings, recommendations and lessons identified during the previous exercises held in Barcelona (January 2025) and Lodz (June 2025). This cumulative approach ensured a progressive refinement of procedures and their implementation, with recommendations from earlier exercises systematically incorporated into subsequent training and operational scenarios.

Each exercise was evaluated in accordance with an agreed and standardised methodology to ensure consistency, comparability and transparency of findings across all locations. The evaluation reports were structured to provide a clear and logical overview of the process and results. Each report included: an Introduction outlining the purpose and scope of the evaluation; a description of the Structure of the Report to facilitate navigation and cross-referencing; a Summary of Validation and Recommendations presenting the key findings and confirming whether procedures were validated (with or without recommendations for improvement); a detailed Evaluation Methodology section; and a dedicated Large-Scale Exercise section specifying the location, time, main and specific objectives, composition of the evaluation team (names, institutions, assigned activities and objectives), and a list of individual evaluation reports for each assessed procedure. Supporting documentation was provided in annexes, including the Evaluator's Procedures Pack containing the written procedures tested and validated during the exercises, and the individual Evaluation Reports forming the evidence base for validation and recommendations.

The evaluation methodology combined observation of training activities with structured assessment of operational performance during the live exercise scenarios. Whenever possible, evaluators attended the theoretical and practical training sessions delivered to hotel staff prior to the exercises in order to compare the training content and delivery with the written procedures developed within the project. During each LSE, evaluators were strategically assigned to specific locations and procedures to maximise coverage and ensure that all key procedures were observed by multiple experts. In several cases, evaluators were instructed to follow the operational flow across different locations (e.g. evacuation routes, sheltering areas, cleaning operations, incident management points) to observe the full implementation cycle of selected procedures such as evacuation, Sheltering in Place (SIP), Remove x3 emergency decontamination, or interoperability with emergency services.

The evaluators focused strictly on the assessment of the HOTHREAT procedures and addressed two core questions: whether the procedures worked in practice, and how effectively they were implemented by hotel staff. For each procedure, strengths and weaknesses were identified both in relation to the procedural design and its practical execution. Observations were recorded using a dedicated evaluation form designed specifically for the LSEs, ensuring a systematic approach

to collecting evidence, formulating conclusions and developing recommendations for improvement. Each procedure was assessed separately, including 5xS (CBRN recognition), Steps 123+ (response assessment), Guidelines for Initial Actions at a CBRN Emergency, ETHANE/THEN reporting, Remove Remove Remove (emergency decontamination), Sheltering in Place (SIP), Interoperability with Emergency Services, the 5-Stage Cleaning Process and associated cleaning checklists, Food Defence procedures, and additional security-related measures such as VIP procedures and suspicious item protocols.

Certain elements were explicitly defined as outside the scope of evaluation unless they directly affected the functioning of the procedures. These included the general design and delivery of training (except where inconsistencies with written procedures were identified), the overall planning and management of the exercise, the operational performance of emergency service responders, the Table-Top Exercise conducted prior to the LSE, and the technical performance of the HOTHREAT App (although informal feedback was provided to developers where relevant). This clear delimitation ensured that the evaluation remained focused on validating the project's procedural outputs rather than assessing external organisational factors.

Immediately after each exercise, a structured "hot debrief" was conducted by the Director of Evaluation with all evaluators to consolidate observations, identify key issues and confirm that all procedures had been sufficiently observed. Evaluators subsequently submitted their written reports within one week, forming the evidentiary basis for a consolidated Draft LSE Evaluation Report. Following internal review and agreement among the evaluation team, a Final Evaluation Report was produced and submitted to the project coordinator within two weeks of the exercise.

Across the four exercises, the majority of procedures were validated as operationally effective. In several cases, recommendations were formulated to strengthen integration of specific procedures—such as 5xS, Steps 123+, ETHANE reporting, Remove x3 and SIP—into the action schemes and training materials to ensure clarity and consistency. Selected refinements were proposed, including clarification of procedure versions, reinforcement of reporting structures, and introduction of practical training rules such as a simplified "buddy system" during Sheltering in Place to improve role distribution and prevent loss of control in the initial phase of an incident. Other procedures, including Guidelines for Initial Actions, Interoperability with Emergency Services, Cleaning and Cleaning Security Checklists, and Food Defence measures, were validated without the need for substantive modification.

Importantly, recommendations identified during each LSE were not treated as isolated observations but were progressively implemented on an ongoing basis before subsequent exercises. This iterative validation process ensured continuous improvement of both procedural design and practical implementation. As a result, the fourth and final LSE in Warsaw represented not only a validation exercise but also a confirmation that the developed HOTHREAT procedures, training framework and organisational solutions constituted a coherent, functional and practically applicable security system for hotels facing CBRN-related threats.

8. Summary

The large-scale exercises implemented under the HOTHREAT project constituted a central component of Work Package 5, focusing on validation, operational testing and capacity-building. Their primary purpose was to test and validate the CBRNe threat response procedures developed within the project in realistic hotel and conference environments, while simultaneously strengthening preparedness through hands-on training. The exercises were designed to assess not only the technical adequacy of individual procedures, but also the overall coherence of command structures, communication flows and inter-agency cooperation mechanisms. Particular emphasis was placed on evaluating coordination between hotel staff and public emergency services, measuring response times, assessing command and decision-making processes, verifying evacuation procedures, testing mass casualty management arrangements and examining readiness for emergency decontamination. Through structured debriefings and comprehensive evaluation reports, each exercise reinforced lessons learned and contributed to the development of a robust body of best practices supported by simulation-based evidence.

Although the original plan envisaged participation of approximately 150 individuals across all exercises, the final cumulative participation exceeded 400 people. This substantial increase reflected strong engagement from project partners, associated stakeholders, hotel operators, emergency services and observers. Participants included hotel management and operational staff, police officers, firefighters, medical responders, civil protection representatives, project experts and evaluators. The scale of participation significantly enhanced the realism of the scenarios and strengthened the reliability of the validation process by exposing procedures to diverse operational perspectives and institutional cultures.

The four large-scale exercises were carefully aligned with the thematic priorities of the project and addressed different operational risk environments relevant to hotels and conference centres. Each scenario reflected a distinct threat context commonly faced by the hospitality sector. One exercise simulated a VIP visit during which a CBRNe threat emerged, testing early warning systems, suspicious item procedures, threat recognition (5xS), communication protocols such as ETHANE, evacuation decision-making and public safety coordination under heightened reputational and security sensitivity. Another scenario focused on an incident occurring during normal hotel operations, assessing day-to-day readiness, internal notification chains, initial response measures including Steps 123+, implementation of “Remove, Remove, Remove,” and practical containment actions prior to full emergency service arrival. A third scenario addressed a food-related CBRNe threat, placing emphasis on food defence mechanisms, contamination recognition, supplier validation processes and the application of cleaning and decontamination protocols, thereby testing procedures linked to food-chain security and back-of-house operations. The fourth exercise simulated a major conference incident involving large numbers of guests, mass casualty management challenges, crowd control, tiered command and control structures and coordination between multiple

responding agencies under time pressure.

Each exercise was preceded by detailed planning documentation that included scenario development, clearly defined objectives, allocation of roles and responsibilities, escalation pathways and identification of decision points. Rules of engagement for public emergency services were agreed in advance, ensuring clarity of operational boundaries and cooperation mechanisms. Necessary equipment, logistical arrangements and safety measures were identified and secured prior to implementation. Risk mitigation protocols were embedded in the exercise design to ensure participant safety while maintaining realism. All exercises were conducted in close collaboration with police, fire and medical services, thereby enabling genuine interoperability testing rather than purely theoretical coordination.

A defining feature of the exercise programme was the systematic evaluation framework applied to all four events. CBRN security experts observed training sessions, operational phases and post-incident activities. They assessed whether the procedures functioned effectively in practice and how they were implemented by hotel personnel. Observations were recorded using standardised reporting templates, and each procedure was evaluated separately to ensure detailed analysis. Following each exercise, structured debriefing sessions were conducted to capture operational insights, clarify decision-making rationales and identify strengths and areas for improvement. Recommendations were consolidated in formal evaluation reports and progressively integrated into subsequent exercises, creating an iterative cycle of refinement and validation. This process ensured that lessons learned were not merely documented but actively embedded in revised training materials, procedural guidance and implementation strategies.

The outcomes of the exercises directly informed deliverables developed in other work packages. By aligning field-tested results with project outputs, HOTHREAT ensured that validated procedures and operational insights were incorporated into final recommendations, guidance materials and training frameworks. This integration enhanced the practical relevance, transferability and scalability of the project results across EU Member States. The evidence base generated through large-scale simulations strengthened the credibility of the developed procedures and supported their positioning as best-practice models for the hospitality sector facing CBRNe risks.

All exercises and related activities were implemented fully in accordance with the Grant Agreement obligations, including timelines, quality assurance standards, reporting requirements and beneficiary involvement. Activities complied with applicable national and EU regulatory frameworks, and no deviations from the approved work plan were recorded. Ethical considerations, safety standards and operational guidelines were consistently respected throughout planning, execution and evaluation phases.

Overall, the large-scale exercises provided critical validation of interoperable command and response procedures between hotel operators and public services, confirmed the practical readiness of hotel and conference staff to detect and manage CBRNe threats, demonstrated

the feasibility of evacuation and emergency decontamination under simulated stress conditions, and reinforced the strength of multi-agency cooperation frameworks in dynamic and high-risk environments. The expanded participation level, exceeding 400 individuals, further underscored the robustness of the exercise design and amplified the project's impact on sector-wide preparedness. Collectively, the exercises delivered tangible, field-tested evidence that the HOTHREAT procedures constitute a coherent, operationally viable and strategically relevant framework for enhancing resilience of hotels and conference facilities against CBRNe-related terrorist threats.